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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the short- and long-term effects of urbanization, via favorable urban 
development policies, on income distribution and social welfare for a developing country. 
The urban manufacturing sector is characterized by imperfect competition and free entry. 
Urbanization shifts rural workers to the highly productive urban sector, while causing 
production in urban firms to expand because of scale economies. However, urbanization 
may worsen wage inequality between skilled and unskilled labor in the short term. In the  
long term, urbanization can attract new firms to the urban sector, and favorable urban 
development policies may result in excessive entry of firms, which can amplify wage 
inequality in the economy. This entry-amplifying effect is confirmed empirically, especially  
for low- and lower-middle-income countries. If the entry effect is not considered, the  
impact of urbanization on wage inequality could be understated by 18% for low- and  
lower-middle-income countries. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Urbanization refers to a population influx from rural to urban areas to seek better 
opportunities, an unavoidable trend in both developed and developing economies. In 
2015, 81.6% of the United States population lived in cities, with an annual growth of 
1.02%, while urban population accounted for 55.6% in the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC), with a 3.05% annual rate of urbanization.1 The United Nations forecasted that 
by 2050, levels of urbanization will reach 86.9% in the United States and 64.1% in the 
PRC (The Economist 2012).  
In developing countries, urbanization is necessary for economic development and  
is almost synonymous with modernization. Harris and Todaro (1970) developed a  
dual-structure model for a developing economy in which the modern urban 
manufacturing sector is much more advanced than the traditional rural agriculture 
sector. In their model, urban workers receive an institutionally set minimum wage rate 
that exceeds the market-determined wage rate in the rural sector. Thus, by shifting 
rural workers to highly productive urban jobs, urbanization can increase production 
efficiency and hence national income (Restuccia and Rogerson 2013). This theory has 
been used to explain the economic advances made in some developed countries. 
However, critics of the above theory view urbanization less favorably, because 
(i) urbanization results in urban unemployment, which can cause social problems 
that are detrimental to the economic welfare of society; 
(ii) urbanization via urban development policies benefits urban firms at the expense 
of the rural sector, which has a negative effect on rural workers; and 
(iii) urbanization may attract new firms to the urban sector, leading to excessive 
entry of firms and thus to a higher demand for skilled labor and capital, which 
improves returns of skilled labor relative to the returns to unskilled labor.  
Thus, urbanization can reduce overall social welfare in the short term if the cost of 
urban unemployment exceeds the benefits of production efficiency. Additionally, in the 
long term, urbanization can widen the wage gap between urban skilled labor and rural 
unskilled labor from excessive entry of firms in the urban sector. 
The issues related to urbanization and urban development policies in developing 
economies are widely covered in the literature on the subject. Using a Heckscher–
Ohlin framework with sector mobile labor and capital as production inputs, Khan 
(1980a) found that the economy can benefit from providing subsidies to labor and 
capital. However, the issue of wage inequality was not addressed in his model, 
because labor is assumed to be homogenous. With regard to production subsidies, 
Beladi and Marjit (1996) found that in a vertically linked Harris–Todaro model, a 
reduction of tariffs on urban goods can reduce capital costs and thus urban 
unemployment. Conversely, Chang, Kaltanic, Loayza (2009) claimed that in the urban 
sector, a reduction of tariffs improves production efficiency but worsens unemployment 
in a Harris–Todaro model that has labor as the only production input. These studies all 
assumed perfect competition in the urban sector, but in reality, imperfect competition 
prevails in the urban manufacturing sector in both developed and developing countries.  
Urbanization can expand firm production because of improved scale economies 
(Krugman 1984), as well as attract new firms to the urban sector. However, favorable 
1  CIA. The World Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ (accessed 
29 March 2016).  
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urban development policies may lead to excessive entry of urban firms (Mankiw and 
Whinston 1986), which may increase the demand for capital and skilled labor and 
hence raise their returns, thereby widening the gap between the returns of skilled and 
unskilled labor. The effect of urbanization on wage inequality was discussed in Kuznets 
(1955), which indicated urbanization as one of the forces that may lead to an inverted 
U-shaped pattern of income inequality. 
The main contribution of this paper is to study the impact of urbanization on income 
inequality under the imperfect competition setting by taking firm dynamics into 
consideration. To this end, the urbanization–excessive-entry argument is connected to 
the distortions literature by Bhagwati (1971). Specifically, based on the existence of  
the institutionally set minimum urban wage, the possibility of a second-best policy 
prescription is suggested, such as subsidies to urban production, to tackle monopoly 
and unemployment distortions, along with free mobility of production factors, which is  
in the national interest of social welfare. The focus is the effects of government 
development policies on the structural transformation of the developing economy by 
shifting rural workers to highly productive urban jobs and enhancing scale economies 
in the urban production sector. 
This paper demonstrates empirically that the implementation of favorable urban 
development policies may widen the income inequality gap via the channel of firm 
dynamics. Thus, it differs from, but also is complementary to, the past literature 
examining the relationship between urbanization and income inequality, which has had 
mixed results. For example, Wheeler (2001) reported a 2.7% increase in a worker’s 
hourly wage in the United States when the population in metropolitan areas doubles; 
using census and survey data, Baum-Snow and Pavan (2013) demonstrated a positive 
relationship between city size and income inequality in the United States. Focusing on 
the PRC, Cai, Chen, Zhou (2010) found that urbanization is a factor that accounts for 
the increase in income inequality in urban areas. However, using the survey data of 
four countries, Kanbur and Zhuang (2013) showed that urbanization has reduced 
income inequality in the PRC, although its impact has been negligible, and has 
widened the income inequality gap in India, Indonesia, and the Philippines.  
In their study of eight countries in the Middle East and North Africa, Acar and Dogruel 
(2012) did not find a statistically significant relationship between urbanization and 
income inequality. As a control variable for their study on financial sector policies and 
income inequality, Johansson and Wang (2014) showed that urbanization has no 
impact (or a negative impact) on income inequality.  
In this paper, however, using a sample based on 106 middle- and low-income 
countries, the theoretical predictions and implications derived in the theoretical model 
regarding both the positive direct and indirect effects of urbanization on income 
inequality are empirically supported. The results show that income inequality can be 
underestimated substantially by 17.5% if the positive indirect effect of firm dynamics is 
not taken into account. 
2. THE MODEL 
Urbanization is examined via urban development policies in a dual developing 
economy, which consists of an urban and rural sector. The former produces a 
manufactured good X by n monopolistic firms, and the latter produces agricultural 
commodity Y in a competitive market. Production of both types of goods requires 
unskilled labor and capital, while fixed inputs (and hence fixed costs) involving skilled 
labor and capital are needed for the production of the manufacturing good X. The 
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existence of fixed costs is a prerequisite for the imperfect competition of urban firms. 
Choosing good Y as the numeraire, the price of the manufacturing good X is denoted 
by p. 
For the demand side of the economy, consumers’ demands for manufacturing and 
agricultural goods are represented by DX and DY with a quasilinear utility function: 
U(DX, DY) = u(DX) + DY, where u′ > 0 and u″ < 0. Utility maximization, subject to the 
budget constraint IA = pDX + DY – T, gives the (inverse) demand function for the 
manufacturing good X: p = p(DX) with pX (= ∂p/∂DX) < 0, where IA denotes after-tax 
income, and T is the lump-sum tax. Due to quasilinear preference, the income effect 
falls entirely on the demand for good y, and the indirect utility function is given by  
V = V(p, IA), with Vp = - DX and VI = 1 by the envelope theorem. For the goods market 
equilibrium, demand for the manufacturing good X is equal to its supply in the 
economy; that is, DX = X. Note that there are n firms in the urban manufacturing sector, 
and, by imposing a symmetry condition, X = nx, where x denotes the output per 
manufacturing firm.  
On the supply side of the economy, by employing unskilled labor (LY) and capital (KY), 
the rural sector produces agricultural commodity Y with a constant returns-to-scale 
production function, so Y = Y(LY, KY). The corresponding unit cost of producing good  
Y is g(wR, r), where wR denotes the rural unskilled wage rate, and r is the capital rental 
rate. The demands for unskilled labor and capital in rural sector Y are respectively 
expressed by LY = gw(wR, rR)Y and KY = gr(wR, rR)Y, where the subscript represents the 
partial derivative. Assuming that the rural agricultural market is perfectly competitive in 
equilibrium, zero profit prevails: 
g(wR, r) = 1 (1) 
where the price of good Y is normalized to unity. 
For the production of the manufacturing good X, there are n firms in the urban sector, 
and each firm produces quantity x under an increasing returns-to-scale technology, in 
which fixed and variable costs are incurred. The fixed cost, F(wS, r), comes from the 
wage payment of skilled labor, and the rental cost of capital with wS denotes the skilled 
wage rate. The variable cost is associated with the payment to production factors of 
unskilled labor and capital input with unit variable cost m(wU, r), where wU denotes the 
urban unskilled wage rate. The total cost for an urban manufacturing firm to produce 
quantity x is therefore C(wS, wU, r, x) = F(wS, r) + m(wU, r)x.  
Utilizing the envelope property, the employment of skilled and unskilled labor for each 
firm in the urban sector is given, respectively, by ls = Fw(wS, r) and lx = mw(wU, r)x. The 
use of capital is kx = Fr(wS, r) + mr(wU, r)x. The subsidy-included profit of an individual 
firm is therefore π = p(X)x – C(wU, wS, r, x) + sx, where s is a per-unit subsidy to the 
urban manufacturing firms. Note that the subsidy is financed by a tax imposed on 
consumers. Profit maximization of each firm in the urban sector yields the equality of 
marginal revenue to marginal cost: 
p(X) + px(X)x = m(wU, r) – s (2) 
Note that Cournot competition (i.e., output adjustment) among urban firms is assumed 
in deriving this first-order profit-maximization condition. 
As noted by Harris and Todaro (1970), the dual developing economy is unevenly 
developed, as the urban manufacturing sector is more advanced than the rural 
agricultural sector, with an institutionally set minimum wage for unskilled labor, wU, 
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which is higher than the market-determined rural wage rate, wR. Due to the set 
minimum wage, urban unemployment (LU) exists. However, the higher urban wage 
attracts rural workers to migrate to the urban sector with a probability of 1/(1 + µ) to  
be employed, where µ (= LU/LX) is a measure of the urban unemployment ratio, and  
LX denotes employment in the urban sector (i.e., LX = nlx). Rural–urban migration stops 
when the perceived urban wage rate equals the rural wage rate: 
α wU/(1 + µ) = wR (3) 
where α < 1, a discounting factor to capture relevant migration costs, such as 
reallocation costs and policy barriers (e.g., the hukou system in the PRC). Note that in 
the original Harris–Todaro model, the expected urban wage rate was wU/(1 + µ).  
In equation 3, an increase in α signifies a reduction in migration costs or a relaxation in 
migration controls.2 Using µ = LU/LX, equation 3 can be rewritten as αwULX = wR(LX + 
LU), which is a rectangular hyperbola depicted in the northeast quadrant in Figure 1, 
called the Harris–Todaro Curve by Corden and Findlay (1975), in which the horizontal 
distance measures the endowment of unskilled labor in the economy (Neary 1981). 
Figure 1: Harris–Todaro Curve and Labor Market Equilibrium 
 
  
2  For example, nonnative workers are not allowed to purchase homes without local hukou in many major 
cities, such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen. See Bond, Riezman, Wang (2016) for a theoretical 
study regarding the hukou barrier on economic development in the PRC. 
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For the factor markets, the market-clearing conditions of skilled labor, unskilled labor, 
and capital are required by  
nFw(wS, r) = LS (4) 
(1 + µ)nmw(wU, r)x + gw(wR, r)Y = L (5) 
n[Fr(wS, r) + mr(wU, r)x] + gr(wR, r)Y= K + K* (6) 
where LS, L, and K denote, respectively, the exogenous supplies of skilled labor, 
unskilled labor, and domestic capital in the economy, while K* represents the inflow of 
foreign capital. Note that in equation 4, full employment prevails in the market of skilled 
labor, which determines its wage rate wS, with ws > wU > wR. 
To complete the setup of the model, the number of urban manufacturing firms n needs 
to be considered. It is fixed in the short term, while in the long term, firms can freely 
enter into or exit from urban manufacturing until zero profit is reached. 
p(X)x – F(wS, r) – m(wU, r)x + sx = 0 (7) 
The model specified in equations 1–7 describes the dual structure of a developing 
economy, in which equations 1–6 determine six unknowns, wR, wS, r, µ, x, and Y, in the 
short term with a fixed number of urban firms n; in the long term, the number of urban 
firms n is determined by the entry/exit condition given in equation 7. The exogenous 
variables in the model include urban development policy variables such as urban 
production subsidy s, urban migration access α, and foreign capital quota K*. This 
framework can be used to examine the short- and long-term impacts of urban 
development policies on wage inequality and social welfare in the developing economy.  
3. URBANIZATION, WAGE INEQUALITY,  
AND SOCIAL WELFARE 
Changes in capital rentals affect the costs of production and hence outputs, influencing 
the wage rates of skilled and unskilled labor in the economy. For the rural sector, the 
relationship between the capital rental and unskilled wage rate can be obtained by 
totally differentiating equation 1 to have 
ˆ Rw = –(θKY /θLY)?̂? (8) 
where θjY represents the cost share of the jth production factor in sector Y. For the 
given price of good Y, to maintain the constant unit cost, a rise in the capital rental will 
yield a negative impact on the unskilled wage rate in the rural sector. This relationship 
is illustrated in the northwest quadrant of Figure 1. 
Since the urban minimum wage (wu) for unskilled labor is fixed, changes in the 
perception of urban earning levels (α) and the rural unskilled wage (wR) will affect labor 
migration and hence the urban unemployment ratio. From equation 3,  
µˆ  = [(1 +µ)/µ](α� – ˆ Rw ). (9) 
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Thus, an increase in urban access to migration can raise the urban unemployment 
ratio; this ratio will go down when the rural wage rises. 
As with urban firms, a change in the capital rental rate can cause a factor substitution 
between capital input and skilled labor in determining the components in the fixed cost. 
From equation 4,  
ˆ Sw  = ?̂? + 𝑛�/ FSXs  (10) 
where FSXs  expresses the substitution effect between skilled labor and capital in sector 
X. 3 Due to the factor substitution effect, a positive relationship exists between the 
capital rental and skilled wage rate in the urban sector, as depicted in the southwest 
section of Figure 1. In addition, the skilled wage rate will be higher if there are more 
firms in the urban sector.  
To obtain the above effects of urbanization on factor returns, its output effects also 
need to be considered. By totally differentiating equation 2, the change in firm output x 
in the urban manufacturing sector is 
–(1 + 1/n)𝑥� = 𝑛� + εb mKXθ ?̂? – εh?̂?  (11) 
where b = m/p and h = s/p. Note that ε = - p/pxX is the price elasticity of demand for 
good x, and mjXθ represents the variable cost share of factor j in producing good x. 
Therefore, from equation 11, the urban rental rate will negatively affect the production 
of good x. It is noted that market competition will reduce firm output, while a subsidy 
will increase production. 
In addition, totally differentiating the factor markets of unskilled labor and capital in 
equations 5 and 6 gives 
(1 +µ) mLXλ 𝑥� + λLY Yˆ =  
–(1 +µ) mLXλ α� – (1 +µ)
m
LXλ 𝑛� – [(1 +µ)
m
LXs + sLY]?̂? +  [(1 +µ) mLXλ + sLY] ˆ Rw  (12) 
m
KXλ 𝑥� + λKYYˆ = δ𝐾�∗ – λKX𝑛� + (
F
KXs  +
m
KXs + sKY)?̂?  – sKY ˆ Rw  – FKXs ˆ Sw  (13) 
where mjXλ  and λjY are, respectively, the allocative shares of variable factor j in sectors 
X and Y.4 Production of goods x and Y will be further adjusted through the changes in 
wage rates and capital rentals, as indicated in equations 12 and 13.  
Details in the Appendix show that for stability, the urban manufacturing sector X is 
required to be capital-intensive relative to the agricultural sector Y in variable inputs; 
that is, |λm| = mKXλ λLY – (1 + µ)
m
LXλ λKY > 0.7
5  
3  The unit fixed cost of an urban firm is F(wS, rU), and the elasticity of factor substitution between skilled 
labor and capital is defined as FXσ = FFwr/FwFr. Following Jones (1965), the substitution effect in demand 
for skilled labor is FSXs  =
F
Xσ
F
KXθ , where 
F
KXθ  (= rUFr/F) is the cost share of capital in the fixed cost of 
sector X. 
4  Note that sLY = σYθKYλLY, where σY = ggwr/gwgr. 
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Note that as observed from the first terms on the right-hand sides of equations 12 and 
13, a more proactive set of urban development policies works to decrease the supply of 
unskilled labor and to increase the supply of capital in the economy. According to the 
Rybczynski effect, this will initially increase the output of good x but reduce the 
production of good Y, and the changes in outputs will be further adjusted when factor 
returns and the number of urban firms change.  
3.1 Short-Term Effects 
By taking into account capital-labor substitution and output effects from equations  
8–13, the overall effects of increases in urban access, foreign capital, and production 
subsidy on the capital rental rate can be solved:  
?̂? /α� = –(1 + 1/n)(1 + µ)λKYθKY mLXλ /D < 0  (14) 
?̂? /𝐾�*= –δ(1 + 1/n)λLYθLY/D < 0 (15) 
?̂? /?̂? = εhθLY|λm|/D > 0 (16) 
where D = (1 + 1/n)[A + λLYθLY mKXs + (1 + µ)λKY(θLY
m
LXs + θKY
m
LXλ )]+εbθLY mKXθ |λ
m| > 0 and 
A = λKYsLY + λLYsKY. Therefore, the capital rental rate will be lowered if the supply  
of production factors in urban areas increases, regardless of unskilled labor or capital, 
but the rental rate will be higher when the production subsidy to output x is increased. 
This will affect the wages of unskilled and skilled labor accordingly. From equations 8 
and 10,  
ˆ Rw /α� = –(θKY/θLY)(?̂?/α�) > 0 (17) 
ˆ Rw /𝐾�*= –(θKY/θLY)(?̂?/α�) > 0 (18) 
ˆ Rw /?̂? = –(θKY/θLY)(?̂?/?̂?) < 0 (19) 
ˆ Sw /α� = ?̂?/α� < 0 (20) 
ˆ Sw /𝐾�* = ?̂?/𝐾�* < 0 (21) 
ˆ Sw /?̂? = ?̂?/?̂? > 0 (22) 
These changes are demonstrated in capital rentals, unskilled wages, and skilled wages 
in Figures 2–4, in which the northeast quadrants represent the market of unskilled labor 
in the economy.  
  
5  As shown in the Appendix, for the stability of the model, the urban manufacturing sector is relatively  
capital-intensive compared to the rural agricultural sector. This factor intensity condition of the  
Harris–Todaro model was stated by Khan (1980b) and used by Chao and Yu (1992). 
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Figure 2: Increase in Urban Migration Access α 
 
Figure 3: Increase in Foreign Capital K* 
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Figure 4: Increase in Urban Output Subsidy s 
 
As indicated in equation 3, a rise in α, K* or s for favorable urban development policies 
raises the demand for unskilled workers LX in the urban sector. This causes a rightward 
shift of the Harris–Todaro migration curve, along with a downward or upward shift of 
the value-of-marginal-product curve of the agricultural sector (YL) by a decrease or 
increase in capital to the rural sector. The capital rental rate falls, rural wage rate rises, 
and urban skilled labor wage rate falls if the migration effect overrides the capital 
reallocation effect. This case applies to a rise in urban access α in equations 14, 17, 
and 20, or a rise in foreign capital K* in equations 15, 18, and 21, but not for a rise in 
production subsidy s in equations 16, 19, and 22. 
In addition, changes in the rural unskilled wage rates affect the incentive for  
rural–urban migration, and hence the urban unemployment ratio. From equation 9,6  
µˆ /α� = [(1 +µ)/µ](1 – ˆ Rw /α�) > 0 (23) 
µˆ /𝐾�* = –[(1 +µ)/µ]( ˆ Rw /𝐾�*) < 0  (24) 
µˆ /?̂? = –[(1 +µ)/µ]( ˆ Rw /?̂?) > 0 (25) 
  
6  µˆ /α� = [(1 + µ)/µ]{(1 + 1/n)[A + λLYθLY mKXs + (1 + µ)λKYθLY
m
LXs ]+εbθLY mKXθ |λ
m|}/D > 0. 
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A rise in urban access or production subsidy increases the urban unemployment ratio 
indicated in equations 23 and 25 because the total capital available in the economy is 
given. However, an increase in foreign capital can create more urban jobs and thus 
lower the urban unemployment ratio in equation 24. 
By solving equations 8–13, the output effects of favorable urban development policies 
can also be obtained:  
𝑥�/α� = εb mKXθ θLYλKY(1 +µ)
m
LXλ /D > 0 (26) 
𝑥�/𝐾�* = δεb mKXθ θLYλLY/D > 0 (27) 
𝑥�/?̂? = εh{λLY(sKY + θLY mKXs ) + λKY[sLY + (1 +µ)
m
LXλ ]}/D > 0 (28) 
Hence, production of urban firms responds positively to these three urban development 
policies. This can be also reflected in a firm’s profit:  
dπ/dα = –[Fw(dwS/dα) + Fr(dr/dα) + xmr(dr/dα)] > 0 (29) 
dπ/dK* = –[Fw(dwS/dK*) + Fr(dr/dK*) + xmr(dr/dK*)] > 0 (30) 
dπ/ds = x – [Fw(dwS/ds) + Fr(dr/ds) + xmr(dr/ds)] ≷ 0 (31) 
Note that dπ/ds > 0 in equation 31 if the incremental gain in output exceeds the 
incremental loss due to a higher cost of production. In this case, the subsidy s 
promotes further entry of firms into the urban manufacturing sector. 
Using the results on outputs and unemployment, the short-term welfare impact of 
urbanization in the dual developing economy can be evaluated. Social welfare is 
represented by the indirect utility function, V = V(p, I), where national income, I, comes 
from factor incomes and profits of urban firms: I = wULX + wRLY + wSLS + rK + nπ. 
Totally differentiating the indirect utility function and then using equations 1–6, the 
change in social welfare for the economy can be obtained: 
dV = (1 – α)wUdLX – K*dr + n(p – m)dx – wRLXdµ (32)  
where p – m = –xpx – s > 0. This welfare expression captures four distortions in the 
economy, imperfect rural–urban migration of unskilled labor, quota restriction on 
foreign capital, imperfect competition of urban firms, and urban unemployment because 
of the set minimum wage. Under the given urban minimum wage, a possible policy 
design can be 
αo = 1 (33) 
ro = r* (34) 
so = –xpx – wRLX(dµ/ds)/n(dx/ds) < – xpx (35) 
That is, for the developing economy, the second-best coordinated policy set is  
(i) free mobility of labor domestically by letting α equal 1 in equation 32 to remove the 
barrier of rural–urban migration, (ii) perfect mobility of capital internationally until the 
domestic rental rate is equal to the world rate in equation 34, and (iii) a production 
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subsidy given to urban firms to correct the product market distortion adjusted by  
urban unemployment. 
In summary, for a dual developing Harris–Todaro economy, by removing the barriers of 
rural–urban migration and relaxing the quota on foreign investment, urban development 
can benefit the economy by reducing wage inequality, reducing urban unemployment, 
and raising social welfare. However, increased urban development resulting from a 
subsidy to urban firms can widen wage inequality and raise urban unemployment, but it 
can still raise social welfare if the favorable output effect overrides the detrimental 
unemployment effect. 
3.2 Excessive Entry of Urban Firms 
In the previous section, the short-term case (in which the number of firms in the  
urban sector is exogenously given) was considered, showing that favorable urban 
development policies can raise the profits of urban firms in equations 29–31. This 
provides an incentive for new firms to enter the urban sector. Consequently, demand 
for capital in the urban sector rises, raising he capital rental rate in the economy. 
Solving equations 1–7,  
?̂?/𝑛� = θLY{(1 + 1/n)(|λ| + λLY FKXs /
F
SXs )] – |λ
m|}/D > 0, (36) 
where |λ| > |λm| and |λ| = λKXλLY – (1 + µ)λLXλKY > 0, expressing that in an average 
sense,7 the urban manufacturing sector X is capital-intensive relative to the agricultural 
sector Y. However, the rise in the capital rental rate in equation 36 raises the 
production cost of good Y and hence lowers its output. This lowers demand for 
unskilled labor, thereby reducing the wage rate in the rural sector:  
ˆ Rw /𝑛� = –(θKY/θLY)(?̂?/𝑛�) < 0 (37) 
This result is depicted in the southwest quadrant of Figure 5. Rural labor consequently 
migrates to the urban area, and the urban unemployment ratio rises:  
µˆ /𝑛� = –[(1 +µ)/µ]( ˆ Rw /𝑛�) > 0 (38) 
The new entry of urban firms increases the demand for skilled labor. This raises the 
skilled wage rate according to equation 10:  
ˆ Sw /𝑛� = ?̂?/𝑛� + 1/ FSXs  > 0 (39) 
In addition, the new entry of urban firms leads to a business-stealing effect by crowding 
out the production of existing urban firms and lowering their profits:  
𝑥�/𝑛� = –[A + λLYθLY mKXs + (1 + µ)λKY(θLY
m
LXs + θKY
m
LXλ ) 
+εbθLY mKXθ (|λ
m| + λLY FKXs /
F
SXs )]/D < 0, (40) 
dπ/dn = –[Fw(dwS/dn) + Fr(dr/dn) + xmr(dr/dn)] < 0 (41)  
7  See Chao and Yu (1997).  
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Figure 5: Increase in the Number of Urban Firms n 
 
For the welfare effect of the new entry of firms to the urban sector, the indirect utility 
function can be differentiated, V(p, I), to obtain: 
dV/dn = (π – sx) + (1 – α)wU(dLX/dn) – K*(dr/dn)  
+ n(p – m)(dx/dn) – wRLX(dµ/dn) (42) 
where dx/dn < 0 and dµ/dn > 0. Setting dV/dn = 0 in equation 42 and evaluating it as 
the second-best urban development policy (i.e., α = 1 and r = r*), the socially optimal 
number of firms in the urban sector is determined at a positive level of profit π o:  
πo = sx – n(p – m)(dx/dn) + wRLX(dµ/dn) > 0 (43) 
This implies that owing to the business-stealing effect and urban unemployment 
problem, free entry to zero profits results in too much entry relative to the socially 
optimal number of firms in the urban sector.8 
In summary, in a dual developing Harris–Todaro economy, the new entry of urban firms 
raises the capital rental rate of the economy. This widens wage inequality by raising the 
wage rate of skilled labor in the urban sector and lowering the wage rate of unskilled 
labor in the rural sector. Although the new entry of firms can reduce the profit of urban 
firms, the optimal number of urban firms is at a level with a positive profit.  
8 Note that excessive firm entry is defined in a similar manner to excessive capacity, in which  
the equilibrium unit cost exceeds the minimum average cost. McGuire and Ohta (2005) and Ohta  
and McGuire (2015) showed that excessive entry can occur in an oligopolistic market for a  
developing economy. 
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3.3 Long-Term Effects with Free Entry 
However, in the long term, individual firms will continue to enter the urban sector until 
profit is reduced to zero as expressed in equation 8. This results in excessive entry of 
firms (from equation 43), which can affect wage inequality and social welfare in the 
economy.9 To obtain the effect of urban development policies on firm entry to the urban 
sector, equation 8 is totally differentiated to have 
[1+ ε(1 – b) F
SXθ /
F
SXs ]𝑛� = –(1 – 1/n)𝑥� – ε[(1 – b) + b
m
KXθ ]?̂? + εh?̂? (44) 
Equation 44 states that new entry by urban firms will be encouraged when the existing 
firm output is small, capital cost is low, and production subsidy is high. By solving 
equations 8–13 and 44, the effects of urban development policies on the number of 
urban firms can be obtained:  
𝑛�/α� = –εθLYλKY(1 +µ) mLXλ ][(1 + 1/n)(1 – b) + (2/n)b mLXθ ]/∆ > 0 (45) 
𝑛�/𝐾�* = –δεθLYλLY[(1 + 1/n)(1 – b) + (2/n)b mLXθ ]/∆ > 0, (46) 
𝑛�/?̂? = –εh{(2/n)[λLY(sKY + 𝑠𝐾𝑋𝑚 ) + λKY[sLY + (1 + µ)(θKY
m
LXλ + θLY𝑠𝐿𝑋𝑚 )] 
– εθLY(1 – b)|λm|}/∆ ≷ 0 (47) 
where ∆ < 0 by the stability condition (Appendix).  Note that 𝑛�/?̂? > 0 in equation 47 if ε is 
not too large.  
In the long term, with free entry or exit of firms, favorable urban development policies 
always attract new firms to the urban sector. Nevertheless, in the presence of urban 
unemployment and the business-stealing effect, free entry to a level of zero profits 
yields excessive entry. Consequently, excessive new entry of urban firms increases the 
demand for skilled labor for setting up fixed costs, which in turn raises the wage rate for 
skilled labor and hence widens the wage gap between skilled and unskilled wages.  
The long-term effect of urban development policies on the capital rental rate can be 
obtained from equations 8–13 and 44 as 
?̂?/α�  = θLYλKY(1 +µ) mLXλ [2/n + (1 + 1/n)ε (1–b) FSXθ / FSXs ]/∆ < 0 (48) 
?̂?/𝐾�*  = δλLXθLY[2/n + (1 + 1/n)ε (1–b) FSXθ / FSXs ]/∆ < 0 (49) 
?̂?/?̂?  = –εhθLY{[(2/n) + ε (1–b) FSXθ / FSXs ] |λm| + (2/n)λLY FKXs / FSXs ]}/∆ > 0 (50) 
These give the changes in the unskilled wage rates in the rural agricultural sector: 
ˆ Rw /α� = –(θKY/θLY)(?̂?/α�) > 0 (51) 
ˆ Rw /𝐾�*= –(θKY/θLY)(?̂?/α�) > 0 (52) 
9 Clementi and Palazzo (2016) found that firm entry and exit can amplify the effects of aggregate shocks. 
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ˆ Rw /?̂? = –(θKY/θLY)(?̂?/?̂?) < 0 (53) 
Note that these long-term impacts of urban development policies on capital rental rates 
and rural unskilled wage rates are qualitatively the same as the ones obtained for the 
short-term cases.  
For the long-term impact on the skilled wage rate, by using ˆ Sw  = ?̂?  + 𝑛� / FSXs  in  
equation 10,  
ˆ Sw /α� = ?̂?/α� + (1/ FSXs )(𝑛�/α�) 
= –θLYλKY(1 +µ) mLXλ [(1 + 1/n)ε(1 – b)
F
KXθ / FSXs  + (2/n)(εb
m
KXθ / FSXs  – 1)]/∆  (54) 
ˆ Sw /𝐾�* = ?̂?/𝐾�* + (1/ FSXs )(𝑛�/𝐾�
*) 
= –δθLYλLY[(1 + 1/n)ε(1 – b) FKXθ / FSXs  + (2/n)(εb
m
KXθ / FSXs  – 1)]/∆  (55) 
ˆ Sw /?̂? = ?̂?/?̂? + (1/ FSXs )(𝑛�/?̂?) > 0 (56) 
Hence, ˆ Sw /α� > 0 and ˆ Sw /𝐾�* > 0 when 𝜎𝑋𝐹  < εb
m
KXθ / FKXθ . That is, urban development 
policies, via increases in urban access, foreign capital, or production subsidy, can raise 
skilled wage rates in the urban sector in the long term if the urban firm’s factor 
substitution effect involved in the fixed cost is not too large. This result is mainly due to 
new entry by urban firms that raises demand for skilled labor and consequently the 
fixed cost for manufactured good X.  
Comparing equations 51–53 with equations 54–56,  
ˆ Sw /α� – ˆ Rw  /α� = –λKY(1 +µ)
m
LXλ [(1 + 1/n)ε(1 – b)(θLY – 
F
SXθ )/ FSXs   
+ (2/n)(εbθLY mKXθ / FSXs  – 1)]/∆  (57) 
ˆ Sw /𝐾�* – ˆ Rw /𝐾�* = –δθLYλLY[(1 + 1/n)ε(1 – b)(θLY – FSXθ )/ FSXs   
+ (2/n)(εbθLY mKXθ / FSXs  – 1)]/∆  (58) 
ˆ Sw /?̂? – ˆ Rw /?̂? > 0 (59) 
Hence, ˆ Sw /α� > ˆ Rw /α�  > 0 in equation 57 and ˆ Sw /𝐾�* > ˆ Rw /𝐾�* > 0 in equation 58, if  
θLY > FSXθ and 𝜎𝑋
𝐹 < εbθLY mKXθ / FKXθ . Note that ˆ Sw /?̂? > 0 > ˆ Rw /?̂? in equation 59.  
In summary, for a dual developing Harris–Todaro economy, free entry or exit of firms in 
the urban sector results in excessive new entry of firms. Due to the excessive-entry 
effect, urbanization via favorable urban development policies can widen the wage gap 
between urban skilled and rural unskilled labor. 
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4. COMPLEMENTARY POLICY 
As shown above, development policies favorable to the urban sector can lead to 
excessive entry of new urban firms and hence worsen wage inequality in the long term. 
To avoid this problem of unbalanced development in the economy, a complementary 
policy for helping the rural agricultural sector can be considered.10 In this section, the 
income distributional issue of a production subsidy to the rural agricultural sector  
is examined. 
Letting z denote a per-unit subsidy to the production of good Y, the equilibrium 
condition for a firm in sector Y stated in equation 1 can be modified as 
g(wR, r) = 1 + z (60) 
Note that the subsidy is financed by a tax on consumers. Totally differentiating 
equation 60 and expressing the variables in percentage change,  
θLY ˆ Rw + θKY?̂? =τ?̂? (61) 
where τ = z/(1 + z). As illustrated in the northwest quadrant of Figure 6, an increase in 
agricultural subsidy z shifts the agricultural unit cost curve outward.  
Figure 6: Increase in Rural Subsidy z  
 
10 See Chang, Kaltanic, Loayza (2009) for a discussion of the role of policy complementarities. 
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In the short term with a fixed number of urban firms, equation 61 can be solved 
together with equations 9–13 to obtain 
?̂? /?̂? = τ(1 + 1/n)[λLYsKY + λKY[sLY + (1 + µ) mLXλ ]/D > 0 (62) 
ˆ Rw /?̂? = τ{(1 + 1/n)[λLY(sKY + 
m
KXs ) + λKY[sLY + (1 + µ)
m
LXs ] + εb
m
KXθ |λ
m|}/D > 0  (63) 
ˆ Sw /?̂? = ?̂?/?̂? > 0 (64) 
Hence, the rural agricultural sector benefits at the expanse of the urban manufacturing 
sector, as indicated by an inward shift of the Harris–Todaro migration equilibrium curve 
in the northeast quadrant of Figure 5. Consequently, both rural wage and capital rental 
rise in equations 62 and 63. Urban firms then substitute skilled labor for capital involved 
in fixed costs, causing an increase in skilled wages in equation 64. However, the higher 
capital rental and skilled wage reduce the profits of the urban firm: 
dπ/dz = – [fw(dwS/dz) + fr(dr/dz) + xmr(dr/dz)] < 0 (65) 
This incentivizes urban firms’ exit from the urban sector in the long term, which can be 
seen by solving equations 63 and 9–13 to obtain 
𝑛�/?̂? = τ[(1 + 1/n)ε(1 – b) + (2/n)εb mKXθ ]{λLYsKY + λKY[sLY + (1 +µ)
m
LXλ ]}∆ < 0 (66) 
In addition, the long-term effects of an agricultural subsidy on the capital rental and 
unskilled wage can be solved:  
?̂? /?̂? = –τ[2/n + ε(1 – b) mSXθ / FSXs )]{λLYsKY + λKY[sLY + (1 + µ)
m
LXλ ]}/∆ > 0, (67) 
ˆ Rw /?̂? = τ/θLY – (θKY/θLY)(?̂? /?̂?) > 0 (68)11 
Since the agricultural subsidy increases the price of good Y, this benefits the 
production factors of capital and unskilled labor. Using equation 10, the long-term 
effects on the skilled wage rate in the urban sector can be obtained: 
ˆ Sw /?̂? = ?̂?/?̂? + (1/ FSXs )(𝑛�/?̂?)  
= (τ/∆)[ε(1 – b) mKXθ / FSXs + (2/n)(εb
m
KXθ /
F
SXs  – 1)][A + λKY(1 + µ)
m
LXλ ] (69) 
Thus, ˆ Sw /?̂? < 0 when 𝜎𝑋𝐹 < εb
m
KXθ / FKXθ . That is, an agricultural subsidy can narrow the 
wage gap in the long term if 𝜎𝑋𝐹 is not too large. 
In summary, for a dual developing Harris–Todaro economy, urbanization, accompanied 
by a subsidy to rural agriculture, may balance the wages between skilled and unskilled 
labor in the economy. 
11  In the long term, ˆ Rw /?̂? = – (τ/∆){(2/n)(B + εb mKXθ λLY
F
KXs / FSXs ) + ε(1 – b)(1 + 1/n)[λLY
F
KXs / FSXs  + B(
F
KXθ /
F
SXs )]}, where B = A + λLY
m
KXs  + λKY(1 + µ) mLXs + εb mKXθ |λ
m|. 
16 
 
                                              
ADBI Working Paper 653 Beladi et al. 
 
5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
In this section, the two main theoretical propositions are evaluated: (i) urbanization may 
cause an increase or decrease in wage inequality in the short term (i.e., proposition 1); 
and (ii) with the free entry of firms in the urban sector, urbanization increases wage 
inequality via the excessive-entry channel (i.e., proposition 3). To assess these  
two propositions, data were collected that measure wage inequality, urbanization, and 
firm entry.  
5.1 Data and Measurement 
To study the impact of urbanization on wage inequality, the sample selection procedure 
begins by focusing on middle- and low-income countries, based on World Bank 
classifications by income level. A dataset is employed comprising an unbalanced panel 
of observations from 106 developing countries from 2002 to 2013. To measure wage 
inequality, Deininger and Squire’s (1996) Gini coefficient of income distribution derived 
from a Lorenz curve is used.12 A high value of the Gini coefficient indicates greater 
income inequality.  
The main independent variable, urbanization, is measured as the ratio of urban 
population to the total population. Past literature found that urbanization can be 
associated with income inequality positively (Cai, Chen, Zhou 2010; Wheeler 2001; 
Baum-Snow and Pavan 2013), negatively (Kanbur and Zhuang 2013, Johansson and 
Wang 2014), or not at all (Johansson and Wang 2014). The data for urbanization are 
obtained from the World Bank.13  
To proxy for firm entry, the cost of starting a new business is estimated, expressed as 
the percentage of income per capita.14 The rationale of using the cost of starting a new 
business as the proxy is that the higher the firm entry rate of an industry, the more 
competitive the industry becomes. Hence, more firms compete for limited resources 
(financial and physical), and this raises the costs of using the resources. In other 
words, a positive relationship between firm entry and the entry cost of starting a new 
business is conjectured. From proposition 3, the firm entry rate is hypothesized to have 
an indirect positive impact on income inequality through urbanization. 
In line with other literature on the topic of income inequality, a set of control variables 
are considered that may affect income inequality: real gross domestic product (GDP) 
per capita growth, government expenditure, inflation, trade openness, level of foreign 
direct investment, (FDI), and level of financial development. Government spending is 
measured by the government consumption expenditure as a share of GDP. Inflation is 
measured by the logarithm of the growth rate of the GDP deflator. Trade openness as 
the proxy of trade liberalization is expressed by the logarithm of the sum of exports and 
imports as a percentage of GDP, while FDI is the logarithm of the net inflows of FDI as 
a share of GDP. Following the financial development literature (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, 
Levine 2007), the level of financial development is measured by the logarithm of the 
12  World Bank. World Development Indicators. http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-
indicators (accessed 2016). 
13  Ibid. 
14 World Bank. Doing Business. http://www.doingbusiness.org/ (accessed 2016). 
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value of credit provided to the private sector by financial intermediaries, divided by 
GDP. The data for control variables are collected from the World Bank.15 
As recommended in the literature, data availability and the data over 3-year, 
nonoverlapping periods are considered to smooth short-term cyclical fluctuations, 
resulting in up to four observations per country. Countries with missing values in all four 
nonoverlapping periods are then removed. Table 1 presents summary statistics for all 
variables used in the analysis.  
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Gini 265 41.32 9.27 16.64 69.47 
Urbanization 424 45.69 18.66 8.91 86.36 
Entry cost 405 82.09 117.33 0.83 983.4 
GDP per capita growth 422 3.22 3.36 –11.99 27.26 
Government expenditure 402 15.28 9.65 2.80 114.01 
Inflation 415 1.84 0.78 –2.41 4.67 
Trade openness 411 4.33 0.44 3.18 5.66 
Foreign direct investment 413 1.08 1.14 –5.50 3.97 
Financial development 417 3.09 0.88 –0.23 5.02 
GDP = gross domestic product. 
Notes: All variables are averaged over a 3-year, nonoverlapping period, and presented in percentage form. Inflation, 
openness, foreign direct investment, and financial development are the logarithm value of the original variables.  
From Table 1, large variations across countries in all key variables are observed. For 
example, the Gini coefficient has an average value of 0.41 and ranges from 0.1664 in 
Azerbaijan (2005–2007) to 0.6947 in Bhutan (2002–2004). Likewise, the average value 
of the urbanization variable is 45.69% and has, as its minimum, 8.91% in Burundi 
(2002–2004), while its maximum of 86.36% is observed in Gabon (2011–2013). Firm 
entry cost has an average value of 82.09% and ranges from 0.83% in Kazakhstan 
(2011–2013) to 983.4% in Sierra Leone (2005–2007).  
5.2 Estimation Strategy 
The following baseline econometric specification is used to examine proposition 1; that 
is, the impact of urbanization on income inequality: 
𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜶2′ 𝑿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (70) 
where i indicates country and t indicates year. The dependent variable 𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑡  is  
the income inequality of country i in year t measured by the Gini coefficient. The 
independent variable 𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑖,𝑡 represents urbanization. X is a set of control variables 
for income inequality, as follows: (i) real GDP per capita growth rate, (ii) government 
expenditure, (iii) trade openness, (iv) FDI, (v) inflation rate, and (vi) financial 
development. 𝛾𝑖 and 𝜑𝑡 are the vectors of dummy variables that account for the country 
and period fixed effect, and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. Robust standard errors are employed 
to correct for heteroscedasticity. 
 
15 World Bank. World Development Indicators. http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-
indicators (accessed 2016). 
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For equation 70, the sign of the coefficient 𝛼1 is of concern. A positive (or negative) 
𝛼1indicates a positive (or negative) relationship between the level of urbanization and 
income inequality. In other words, income inequality increases (or decreases) as the 
level of urbanization increases.  
Apart from the baseline specification, to examine proposition 3, the impact of firm entry 
(proxied by the entry cost) on the level of urbanization is allowed by introducing an 
interaction term for urbanization: 
𝛼1 = 𝜃1 + 𝜃2𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 (71) 
where 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 is the 1-year lag of firm entry cost as measured by the cost of 
starting a business enterprise as a percentage of income per capita.  
Substituting equation 71 into equation 70 yields 
𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝜃1𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃2𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑖,𝑡 +𝜶3′ 𝑿𝑖,𝑡 +𝛾𝑖 + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (72) 
where 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is the interaction term for urbanization.  
By re-arranging equation 72, the following specification is obtained: 
𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + (𝜃1 + 𝜃2𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1) ∗ 𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑖,𝑡 +𝜶3′ 𝑿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 +𝜑𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,  (73) 
where the combined coefficient (𝜃1 + 𝜃2𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1) of urbanization consists of the 
direct effect (𝜃1) and indirect effect via the 1-year lag entry cost (𝜃2𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1) on 
income inequality. 
5.3 Empirical Results 
The results of the fixed-effect regression are reported in Table 2.  
In column 1, which shows the results for the baseline model, the coefficient of the level 
of urbanization is negative, although it is not statistically significant at 1% or 10%. This 
result implies that the level of urbanization has no impact on income inequality, which is 
consistent with the result obtained for one of the specifications in Johansson and Wang 
(2014) and the findings in Acar and Dogruel (2012) for eight countries in the Middle 
East and North Africa.  
Column 2 shows that urbanization has a positive and statistically significant coefficient, 
indicating that countries with a higher level of urbanization tend to have high income 
inequality. The positive coefficient estimate of urbanization 𝜃1  measures the direct 
effect of the level of urbanization on income inequality. So, a 1% increase in the level of 
urbanization is associated with a 0.35% increase in income inequality. Further, the 
coefficient estimate of the interaction term 𝜃2 is 0.0008 and statistically significant at 
1%. This result indicates that the effect of urbanization on income inequality is stronger 
in countries with a higher firm entry cost (or a higher firm entry rate). In terms of the 
economic effect, since the average 1-year lag of entry cost is 92.28%, for a 1% 
increase in urbanization, income inequality increases by 0.074% (0.0008 × 92.28%). 
Thus, the total effect of urbanization on income inequality is approximately equal  
to 0.424% (0.35% + 0.074%). The results suggest that the economic effect of 
urbanization on income inequality is underestimated by 17.5% (0.074/0.424) if firm 
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entry is not taken into account. These empirical findings appear to be consistent with 
proposition 3. 
Table 2: Direct and Indirect Effects of Urbanization on Income Inequality 
Dependent Variable: Income Inequality Equation 70 Equation 72 
Urbanization –0.0253  
(0.2161) 
0.3457  
(0.1903)* 
Entry cost (t–1) × urbanization  0.0008  
(0.0003)*** 
GDP per capita growth –0.0514  
(0.0815) 
0.0451  
(0.1019) 
Government expenditure –0.0136  
(0.1528) 
–0.1437  
(0.1596) 
Inflation –0.3606  
(0.5141) 
–0.0974  
(0.5788) 
Trade openness –1.2634  
(2.2809) 
1.4481  
(2.5786) 
Foreign direct investment –0.6587  
(0.4939) 
–0.9142  
(0.6700) 
Financial development –0.3601  
(1.1925) 
–0.063  
(1.2923) 
Constant 51.9555  
(17.3617)*** 
19.6025  
(10.6398)* 
Country dummies Y Y 
Period dummies Y Y 
R2 0.2224 0.4685 
Countries  103 92 
Obs. 247 176 
GDP = gross domestic product. 
Notes: The robust standard error is reported in parentheses. * and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%  
and 1%, respectively. 
5.4 Income Inequality and Development Levels 
To determine whether the impact of urbanization on income inequality differs for 
countries at different development levels, the full sample is split into two groups:  
(i) low- and lower-middle-income countries, and (ii) upper-middle-income countries. 
Equations 70 and 72 are then re-estimated, using these two groups separately. Table 3 
shows that the impact of urbanization (with or without the firm entry cost channel) 
seems to be driven by low and lower middle-income countries.  
The coefficients for urbanization in equations 70 and 72 are observed, and the 
interaction terms are not statistically significant for the upper-middle income countries. 
However, the results obtained for low- and lower-middle-income countries are 
consistent with those obtained for the full sample. In particular, the panel results for 
low- and lower-middle-income countries provide greater evidence of the effect of 
urbanization on income inequality. The coefficient representing the direct effect of 
urbanization is 0.6861, while the indirect effect via the firm entry cost channel is 
0.0012. Given that the average 1-year lag of firm entry cost for low- and lower-middle 
income countries is 127.97%, the total effect of urbanization on income inequality is 
0.8397% (0.6861 + 0.0012 * 127.97). In other words, on average, a 1% increase  
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in urbanization will lead to an average increase of 0.8397% in income inequality in  
low- and lower-middle-income countries. In addition, the underestimation of the effect 
of urbanization on income inequality is 18% (0.1536/0.8397) if the firm entry cost 
channel is not considered. 
Table 3: Impact on Income Inequality at Different Development Levels 
Dependent Variable:  
Income Inequality 
Low- and Lower-Middle-Income Upper-Middle-Income 
Equation 70 Equation 72 Equation 70 Equation 72 
Urbanization –0.4556 
(0.6521) 
0.6861 
(0.3641)* 
0.2108  
(0.1556) 
0.3934 
(0.2687) 
Entry cost (t–1) × urbanization  0.0012 
(0.0003)*** 
 –0.0002 
(0.0003) 
GDP per capita growth –0.068  
(0.1658) 
–0.1411 
(0.1834) 
0.0222  
(0.0596) 
0.0749 
(0.1081) 
Government expenditure 0.2507  
(0.2036) 
–0.1697 
(0.1807) 
–0.4069 
(0.2159)* 
–0.3143 
(0.2993) 
Inflation –0.0323 
(1.0243) 
–0.2226 
(0.7345) 
–0.4658  
(0.476) 
–0.6318 
(0.6724) 
Trade openness 0.2129  
(2.8683) 
2.7334 
(4.2525) 
0.6841  
(2.8536) 
–0.1188 
(2.0262) 
Foreign direct investment –0.8816 
(0.7769) 
–0.8226 
(0.8492) 
–0.3265 
(0.5559) 
–0.9754 
(0.9000) 
Financial development –2.3692 
(2.1646) 
–1.3790 
(1.7335) 
1.1491  
(1.0184) 
–0.0574 
(1.8077) 
Constant 62.1211 
(27.9677)** 
6.2385 
(15.5746) 
31.2830 
(13.9229)** 
26.6628 
(15.1063)* 
Country dummies Y Y Y Y 
Period dummies Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.2539 0.5875 0.3685 0.4326 
Countries  65 57 38 35 
Obs. 135 96 112 80 
GDP = gross domestic product. 
Notes: The robust standard error is reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 
1%, respectively. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Using a general-equilibrium framework for a dual developing economy, this paper 
examined the short- and long-term effects of urbanization, via favorable urban 
development policies, on income distribution and social welfare of the economy. The 
developing economy is characterized by an imperfectly competitive urban sector 
together with a perfectly competitive rural sector. Urbanization not only shifts rural 
workers to highly productive urban jobs, but also expands firm production to realize 
benefits from scale economies. Most significantly, urbanization attracts new firms to  
the urban manufacturing sector. Nevertheless, in the long term, favorable urban 
development policies can result in excessive entry of firms to the urban sector, which 
may widen the wage inequality gap between skilled and unskilled labor in the economy. 
This entry-amplifying effect has been confirmed empirically, especially for low- and 
lower-middle-income countries. If the firm entry effect is not considered, the impact of 
urbanization on wage inequality could be understated by as much as 18%.  
 
21 
 
ADBI Working Paper 653 Beladi et al. 
 
This argument can also be connected to the distortions literature. Based on  
the existence of the institutionally set minimum urban wage, the possibility of a  
second-best policy prescription is considered, such as subsidies for urban production 
to tackle monopoly and unemployment distortions, along with free mobility of 
production factors, which can help improve social welfare. Although the focus has been 
on the effects of government development policies on the structural transformation of 
the developing economy, urbanization, accompanied with a subsidy to rural agriculture, 
can balance the differences in wages for skilled and unskilled workers. 
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APPENDIX 
Letting a dot over a variable represent the time derivative (e.g., ?̇? = dX/dt), the 
adjustments of the model in equations 1, 2, 5, 6, and 7 can be approximated linearly as 
⎝
⎜
⎛
?̇?
?̇? 𝑤𝑅̇
?̇?
?̇? ⎠
⎟
⎞
 = H 
⎝
⎜
⎛
𝑥�
𝑌�
𝑤�𝑅
?̂? 
𝑛� ⎠
⎟
⎞
 
where the H matrix is 
(1 1/ ) 0 0 1
0 0 0
(1 ) [ (1 ) ] (1 ) (1 )
( /
(1 1/ ) 0 0 [(1 ) [1 (1 ) / ]
m
KX
LY KY
m m m m
LX LY LY LX LY LX LX
m m F F
KX KY KY KY KX KX KX SX
m F m
LX SX SX
n b
s s s
s s s s s
n b b b s
ε θ
θ θ
µ λ λ µ λ µ µ λ
λ λ λ
ε θ ε θ
 − + − −
 − − 
 + − + + + + +
 
− + + 
 − − − − + − + − 
 
The principal minors of the above coefficient matrix are given by 
∆1 = –(1 + 1/n) < 0, 
∆2 = 0, 
∆3 = –λLYθLY(1 + 1/n) < 0, 
∆4 = D = (1 + 1/n)[A + λLYθLY mKXs + (1 + µ)λKY(θLY
m
LXs + θKY
m
LXλ )]  
+ εbθLY mKXθ |λ
m| > 0, and 
∆5 = ∆.  
The stability condition requires that the odd principal minors are nonpositive and even 
principal minors are nonnegative. Hence, for stability of the model, |λm| > 0 and ∆ > 0 
are needed.  
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